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Open access under CC BYIn the last few years high and unstable food and agricultural commodity prices and concerns about pop-
ulation growth, increasing per capita food demands and environmental constraints have pushed agricul-
ture and food production up national and international political, policy and research agendas. Drawing on
both theory and empirical evidence, this paper argues that fundamental impacts of links between agri-
cultural productivity sustainability and real food price changes are often overlooked in current policy
analysis. This is exacerbated by a lack of relevant and accessible indicators for monitoring agricultural
productivity sustainability and real food prices. Two relatively simple and widely applicable sets of indi-
cators are proposed for use in policy development and monitoring. Historical series of these indices are
estimated for selected countries, regions and the world. Their strengths, weaknesses and potential value
are then discussed in the context of the need for better sustainable agricultural development and food
security indicators in any post 2015 successors to the current MDGs.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Recent years have seen increasing average food prices, severe
food price shocks (in 2008 and 2010/2011), and increasing con-
cerns about the impacts of food prices shocks, high food prices
and food price volatility on poor and food insecure people. This pa-
per reviews historical changes in staple food prices (in terms of
international grain prices) and then uses basic microeconomic
development theory to consider agricultural productivity and food
price impacts on and roles in development and poverty reduction.
This provides a foundation for subsequent design of indicators for
monitoring agricultural productivity change and food price
changes relative to the real incomes of poor people. Historical ser-
ies of two sets of indicators are estimated for selected countries, re-
gions and the world, and their strengths, weaknesses and potential
value discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the chal-
lenges posed by this analysis in the context of growing threats to
global food availability and the relevance of the proposed indica-
tors to debates on new international development goals to follow
the Millennium Development Goals after 2015.d Policy, SOAS, University of
C1H 0XG, United Kingdom.
-NC-ND license.Long term changes in staple food prices
Changes in staple food prices involve changes in the opportu-
nity cost of food consumption and production in terms of real in-
come and substitution effects for consumers and cost,
substitution and income effects for producers (Dorward, 2012).
Monetary food prices should therefore be compared with other
price series when looking at price changes: they should be deﬂated
by consumer price indices and income comparators when examin-
ing food price changes for consumers, and deﬂated by other agri-
cultural product prices and by input prices when examining food
price changes for producers, as shown in Fig. 1.1
Fig. 1a contrasts changes in nominal grain prices and prices de-
ﬂated by the US CPI. The former demonstrates more about the ef-
fects of inﬂation on the value of money than about food prices
faced by consumers, the latter is a more conventional indicator
for showing real price changes. The common analysis of changes
in real prices relative to US CPI, however, ignores differences be-
tween rich and poor consumers in the importance of food in their
expenditures and in the composition of their non-food expendi-
tures. It also ignores changes in expenditure composition as popu-
lations grow richer. The apparent price fall is in fact an inevitable1 International grain prices are summarised using the World Bank Development
Prospects Group ‘cereals’ price index. This hides considerable diversity in shorter term
price ﬂuctuations between maize, wheat and rice, but shows well the broad patterns
which are common to all the main grains.
Fig. 1. Indexed grain prices 1960–2011 (2005 = 100). Sources: (World Bank, 2012), (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
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expenditure patterns of people achieving and enjoying economic
and real income growth (Dorward, 2011). It may therefore provide
a reasonable assessment of price changes for less poor populations
for whom the CPI used is appropriate, with a low proportion of
expenditure on food. It is, however, misleading when used to
examine long term food prices changes for poor people whose
expenditure patterns are not reﬂected by the US CPI.
Changes in grain prices deﬂated by GDP/capita for high income
countries, low income countries and the world (Fig. 1b) show a
similar pattern as the deﬂation of grain prices using the US CPI,
but only show the 2008 spike, not the 2010/2011 spike. This is be-
cause 2011 GDP per capita data were not available at the time of
writing, and the annual average for 2010 masks the increases in
grain prices in late 2010. However it does show that prices deﬂated
by high income country GDP per capita have fallen more than
prices deﬂated by low income country GDP per capita. This sug-
gests that falls in real food prices have been greater for richer peo-
ple than for poorer people (Dorward, 2011). However skewed
income patterns within countries mean that Fig. 1b does not pro-
vide much information about the scale of differences in food price
changes between rich and poor consumers.
For measures of price changes more relevant to grain producers’
decisions (though not necessarily to their relative incomes), Fig. 1c
shows international grain prices deﬂated by the prices of other
agricultural commodities that farmers might produce (althoughthis does not allow for the effects of tariffs, subsidies and technical
change on different commodities’ relative proﬁtability). This anal-
ysis shows no clear secular change in grain prices relative to other
agricultural commodities. Fig. 1d, however, shows a dramatic fall
in the price of grains relative to energy during and following the
1970s oil crisis and from 2002. A similar pattern, but considerably
dampened, is observed for the price of grains prices relative to
fertilisers.
In summary then, nominal grain prices have risen dramatically
since the 1960s, but in real terms
 They have fallen substantially relative to the prices of other
goods and services consumed by richer people.
 They have fallen substantially relative to the incomes of rich
people.
 There are no readily available indicators of changes more rele-
vant to poor consumers in poor countries, but price falls are less
than for rich consumers (see below and Dorward, 2011).
 There are no clear changes against prices of other agricultural
commodities.
 They have fallen dramatically against oil prices and less dramat-
ically against the prices of fertilisers.
These observations raise two questions: why do we observe
these patterns, and what is their signiﬁcance for understanding
the long term developmental impacts of food price changes?
Table 1
Annual changes in yields and areas from 1961 and 2000. Source: Author calculations from (World Bank, 2011).
Period High income (OECD) (%) Upper middle income (%) Lower middle income (%) Low income (%) World (%)
Cereal land 1961–2009 0.08 0.77 0.79 1.63 0.65
Arable land 1961–2008 0.09 1.77 0.65 0.95 0.60
Cereal land 2000–2009 0.28 0.49 0.53 2.43 0.55
Arable land 2000–2008 0.46 0.12 0.25 1.22 0.02
Cereal yield 1961–2009 1.90 2.30 2.04 0.96 1.85
2000–2009 1.43 1.73 1.60 1.18 1.38
2 In the long run low and stable food prices are non-excludable and non-rival
beneﬁts (raising real incomes of consumers, avoiding negative impacts of high food
prices on the welfare of poor food insecure people, and promoting wider develop-
ment, as argued later) from government investment in agricultural research, and they
also arise as an externality from commercial research investments in excludable
technologies. In the short term they arise as externalities from producers’ and traders’
decisions to produce and sell food.
3 Potential limits on continued expansion of high external input and energy
dependent technologies from global environmental problems associated with them
are discussed later, but reductions in these ‘public bads’ are another form of global
public good from investments in agricultural technology development.
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We structure discussion of the two questions about the causes
and effects of long term patterns of food price change by consider-
ing three factors affecting and affected by long term food price
changes: area expansion, technical and institutional change, and
structural change.
Area expansion
A major long run change affecting food prices has been the his-
torical expansion of the area planted to food crops. Table 1 shows
how ﬁgures for areas under cereals and arable production have
changed since 1961 and 2000. Although the accuracy and reliabil-
ity of some of these ﬁgures may be questioned (for example there
is a sudden large jump in reported areas under cereals in upper
middle income countries in 1992), there appear to be two consis-
tent patterns of change. First, there is an increasing area under
cereals and wider arable production in lower income countries
(with increases in cereal areas in low income countries partly at
the expense of other crops’ share of land). Second, there is a slowly
declining area under cereals and wider arable production in higher
income countries. Rates of growth (decline) are higher for low
(high) income countries in the period from 2000 (although this
may not pick up responses to higher 2008 prices). However contin-
ued expansion of cultivated areas is problematic in most parts of
the world due to (a) environmental and sustainability problems
with cultivation in marginal and forested land and (b) shortages
of other fertile and well watered land (for example Hazell and
Wood, 2008; Foresight, 2011), although there is potential for sub-
stantial expansion of cultivated areas in parts of sub Saharan Africa
(for example Binswanger-Mkhize and Morris, 2009), despite sub-
stantial challenges (Binswanger-Mkhize and Morris, 2009; Hazell
and Wood, 2008).
Technical and institutional change
The major long run change affecting food prices considered in
neo-classical economic theory is technical change, the change in
production functions as a result of technical innovation and new
technology. This is amajor driver of global increases in cereals yields
and, with increases in cultivated areas discussed above, of historical
production increases. Technical change may be embodied in new
forms of physical and natural capital (for example machinery and
seeds). Another form of very long run change is the development
of new institutions – rules and structures governing social, political
and economic interactions (North, 1990). Theories of induced tech-
nical and institutional change relate technology, institutions, re-
source endowments and culture together, with changes in each
driving interactive change in others (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984).
Such analysis suggests that high food prices raise the incentives
for governments and private companies to invest more in agricul-
tural research, to develop such technologies, and implement poli-
cies and services that will promote the adoption of such
technologies. It is widely argued that low food prices (relative toother commodities) caused many governments and the interna-
tional community to reduce their investment in agricultural re-
search: this is cited by some authors as one of the causes of the
slow-down in agricultural productivity growth from the mid
1990s (for example Piesse and Thirtle, 2009). Timmer (2010) ar-
gues that there is a roughly thirty year cycle of world food crises,
as falling food prices depress government and private investment
in agricultural research, until the rate of growth in demand over-
takes supply, triggering a crisis, which kick starts renewed invest-
ment in research until prices fall again: far sighted governments
should therefore invest more consistently to prevent food crises
in the future. However global trade means that low and stable food
prices are a global public good2 and hence investment in agricul-
tural research should be globally coordinated.3 This recognises that
governments have an interest in preventing food price crises.
However this interest arises not just from the consideration of the
negative ‘short and medium term’ impacts discussed by Dorward
(2012). There is a much more fundamental, long term reason for
governments concerned about their citizens’ welfare to seek long
term falls in food prices: in order to promote structural change
and economic growth.Structural change
Governments and other agencies seeking to promote poverty
reduction and economic growth and development should have a
particular interest in lowering food prices relative to income as
these are an important determinant of wider economic growth.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows how agricultural labour
productivity plays a foundational role within wider economic
development processes.
Following a long standing literature on the role of agricultural
development in wider development processes (for example John-
ston and Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 1995; Timmer, 1988) and in line
with more recent empirical work (Christiaensen et al., 2011),
Fig. 2 shows how agricultural revolutions that raise agricultural la-
bour productivity in poor agrarian economies can play multiple
foundational roles in wider development processes. Starting in
the top left corner, new technologies and resources that increase
production per worker also increase food availability per worker.
With higher labour productivity this then lowers the cost (and
hence price) of food relative to agricultural worker incomes, which
raises agricultural workers’ budget surpluses after food expendi-
tures and hence increases their real incomes, and stimulates
Fig. 2. Food, energy and development processes and challenges.
A. Dorward / Food Policy 39 (2013) 40–50 43demand for non-food goods and services. At the same time higher
agricultural labour productivity releases agricultural labour from
food production to production of other goods and services (as few-
er workers are needed to produce the food that society requires).
Agricultural labour productivity growth in poor agrarian econo-
mies thus simultaneously raises productivity of poor countries’
and poor people’s abundant and critical resource (agricultural la-
bour), raises their real incomes, and stimulates both supply and de-
mand of non-food goods and services (in the centre of the ﬁgure).
This simultaneous creation of supply and demand is critical to but
often lacking in changes stimulated by development interventions.
The ﬁgure also shows, starting from the lower right corner, how
industrial, service and knowledge revolutions have built on the ba-
sic, initial increase in supply and demand for non-food goods and
services to lower the labour costs of their production. In this these
revolutions are performing the same function as the earlier agricul-
tural revolution. However agriculture’s relative importance, and
the potential beneﬁts from increased agricultural labour produc-
tivity then fall, as food production’s shares of labour use and
expenditure fall. This is matched by increasing importance of
industrial, service and knowledge revolutions in raising the pro-
ductivity of increasing amounts of labour involved in the produc-
tion of non-food goods and services, which are responsible for an
increasing share of consumer expenditures.4
A number of points should be noted about this analysis.
First, falling food prices relative to incomes are an essential part
of this process and have been a characteristic of all wealthy and
developed economies, and indeed of all wealthy groups within rich
and poor societies. This may be considered an ‘economic truth’ that
arises from a fundamental ‘accounting identity’ (Schelling, 1995)5:4 Increases in agricultural labour productivity can also promote investments in
education (Chapoto et al., 2012) and the structure of local nonfarm activities, the
latter arising as both labour supply and consumer demand lead to an increase in high-
wage non-farm activities at the expense of low-wage activities (see for example
Haggblade et al., 2010).
5 I am indebted to Dirk Bezemer for drawing this to my attention.economic growth, particularly in the poorest economies and for the
poorest people, is growth in resources available for non-food produc-
tion and growth in income available for non-food consumption.
Second, broadbased increases in agriculturalworkers’ productiv-
ity in staple food production on small farms offer an important – but
challenging and transitional – means of widespread, pro-poor
growth in poor agrarian economies.6 They lead to increases in pro-
ductivity and in returns to large amounts of relatively unproductive
resources (land and labour) that are important in both the national
economy and in the livelihoods of poor people. As noted earlier, these
labour productivity changes simultaneously stimulate (a) a push of la-
bour into thesupplyofnon-foodgoodsand servicesand (b)an increase
in incomeavailable for thepurchaseof thesegoodsandservices,which
later pulls labour out of agriculture. Large scale mechanised commer-
cial agriculture or mining with increases in capital intensive produc-
tivity outside the smallholder sector do not deliver these
coordinated stimuli in poor agrarian economies if they do not raise
the overall productivity of the existing agricultural work force.
This is important in ongoing debates about the relative roles of
small and large scale farms in agricultural development (see for
example Collier and Dercon, 2009; Hazell et al., 2010). Of course
policy may seek to reproduce these coordinated stimuli, using
taxes and subsidies to transfer income from owners of capital
and smaller numbers of skilled workers to poor rural people (as
for example with social protection policies in Brazil). However this
presents signiﬁcant political economy and governance challenges
and requires a large, highly productive and rapidly growing large
scale capital intensive sector to support these very large transfers.
It also misses an important potential growth opportunity by not
simultaneously raising the productivity of poor people’s labour –
unless rural labour can be quickly absorbed into rapidly growing
labour intensive manufacturing. Consideration of the relative mer-
its of large scale and small sale agricultural development must take6 The importance of ‘labour demanding technical change’ has long been recognised
in agricultural economics literature – for example Lipton and Longhurst (1989).
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ity, productivity growth and size between the large and small scale
agriculture sectors.7 Large capital intensive agriculture may be
appropriate in emerging and middle income economies, but despite
signiﬁcant difﬁculties with smallholder development is unlikely to
provide efﬁcient and rapid routes to poverty reduction and broad
based growth in many poor agrarian economies8 – though they
may still have useful roles to play alongside smaller farms.
Third, there are major challenges in achieving welfare and
developmental beneﬁts from low food prices without undermining
incentives for farmers to invest in new technologies and increased
production. The ‘food price tightrope’ (Lipton, 2003) needed to
tread this path is particularly difﬁcult in the early stages of growth
in poor agrarian economies. Governments have used a variety of
output, input, and technology and investment support policies to
promote increased food crop production and productivity without
‘high’ prices. Some of these policies have been remarkably success-
ful, while others have been disastrous failures (for example
Dorward et al., 2004).
Fourth, both the agricultural and the industrial, service and
knowledge revolutions have been based (inter alia) on fossil fuels
for tillage and nitrogen ﬁxation and on increased use of material in-
puts raising productivity of labour use and displacing labour. How-
ever there is growing evidence and concern about environmental
limits on continued high dependence on fossil fuels and materials,
about rising prices of energy and material inputs, and about
increasing competition between food and energy production (for
example Foley et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011; Godfray et al., 2010a;
Naylor, 2011). Furthermore, while various positive feedbacks have
supported development processes in the past (for example capital
accumulation; economies of scope in technology development
and knowledge generation and application; improved health and
human capital; and positive aspects of globalisation) some of these
may be reaching their limits while negative feedbacks are growing
in importance. These include limits to natural resource availability
(for example water and land), loss of natural resources due to over-
exploitation and degradation, reduced productivity due to waste
and pollution (with climate change perhaps the most serious and
egregious example), associated biodiversity loss, health problems
(increasing incidence of obesity and related diseases alongside con-
tinued undernutrition – McLellan, 2002; Prentice, 2006), and nega-
tive impacts of globalisation and inequity.
Fifth, and drawing together previous points, limits and threats
to increased labour productivity in food production are threats
not only to the ability of the world to feed its growing population
and to provide that population with high levels of material con-
sumption and prosperity: they are also a threat to achievement
of the fundamental processes on which development is based (as
suggested in the ﬁrst point above). This raises serious questions
about alternative less material visions of prosperity based, for
example, on greater sharing of services and less material consump-
tion (for example Jackson, 2009) and about the extent to which
non-industrial forms of agricultural (such as agroforestry or agro-
ecological, conservation or organic farming) can support developed
societies if they require higher labour input per unit output to
maintain or raise per hectare yields.9 These issues raise critical7 Christiaensen et al. (2011) provide a useful empirical examination of these issues.
8 The arguments in this paragraph are also relevant to explanations of how some
small trading countries (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) and some oil rich
countries have achieved rapid growth without developing their own agricultural
sectors: these countries have normally started with very small poor rural populations
and have relied on agricultural development in other countries for low price food
imports.
9 Such approaches are often criticised for having high labour requirements,
although this is by no means universal (for example herbicide use in conservation
farming reduces weeding labour requirements).questions not only about global food and agricultural systems and
the prospects of poor agrarian economies: they are fundamental to
aspirations about standards and modes of living in developed econ-
omies too, and about structures of society and economic activity (for
example Lang, 2010; Van Der Ploeg, 2010; Weis, 2010).
This analysis highlights the importance of long run technical
and structural changes that underpin economic development and
‘developed’ societies: food prices, agricultural worker productivity,
and global threats to supply/demand balances are fundamental
long term development issues. Not only are they critically impor-
tant for poorer children’s and adults’ food security, health and
physical and mental development, they affect the global economy
and the welfare of rich nations and people. However the critical
role of and links between agricultural labour productivity, real food
prices and incomes, and core development processes have received
very little attention in policy debates in recent years. An examina-
tion of the extensive academic literature and reports on recent food
price rises has found no reference to these linkages. Widespread
discussion of agricultural productivity makes no or little reference
to labour productivity, and is generally implicitly or explicitly
couched in the context of crop yield (land) productivity.10
Research and policy for high rural labour productivity in sus-
tainable and resilient agricultural and food systems therefore need
much greater explicit attention in international policy than they
have had in the past – they should for example be a core part of
any successor to the Millennium Development Goals after 2015
(Waage et al., 2010). Their inclusion in such a scheme, however,
needs coordination around policy goals and targets, and targets
need indicators. In the following sections we therefore consider
possible indicators for use in national and international policy.
We consider ﬁrst indicators of agricultural productivity change
and then of food price changes.
Before moving on, however, it is important to note that similar
arguments may be made about energy costs and prices as about
food costs and prices: low energy costs and prices are also funda-
mental to modern economies and standards and modes of living
(depending to some extent on climates). This exacerbates the
agricultural labour productivity and food price threats to prosper-
ity and development discussed here – unless low cost renewable
energy sources and systems can be rapidly developed and
deployed.Developing indicators of agricultural productivity change
We now consider possible indicators for use in national and
international policy concerned with promoting agricultural pro-
ductivity that supports the fundamental development processes
and addresses the constraints and threats identiﬁed in the previous
section. This is an issue that is of particular importance given
growing debate about what could and should follow the current
MDGs after 2015. We ﬁrst identify the desirable features that such
indicators should have if they are to be useful in supporting na-
tional and international target setting and monitoring. Experience
with the MDGs is useful here (see Waage et al., 2010). We identify
4 broad criteria10 For example de Schutter (2011), Foresight (2011), Headey and Fan (2010), IAASTD
(2009) and World Bank (2009, 2012b) make no mention of the importance of
agricultural labour productivity, and Conforti (2011) includes some discussion of its
evolution (Schmidhuber et al., 2011; von Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2011) but not of its
signiﬁcance. Even World Bank (2007) only emphasises the impacts of agricultural
labour productivity on growth in more technical boxes, with the main text generally
referring more broadly to agricultural productivity impacts, again frequently in the
context of crop productivity and yields.
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demands that they should have a sound theoretical basis, dis-
courage ‘goal displacement’ difﬁculties, be intuitively meaning-
ful and appealing to policy makers and the wider public, and
promote holistic thinking within and across sectors.
2. Indicators should also be consistently applicable over time and
across different countries and different circumstances in order
to allow (a) comparison across countries and regions and (b)
analysis of change within countries and regions.
3. Timely and sufﬁciently comprehensive and reliable and accu-
rate data for these indicators should be either available or
potentially available (ideally the former), at reasonable cost
for national, regional and global calculations.
4. Ideally such data should already be available for historical anal-
ysis and comparisons.
Earlier sections of this paper have established that staple food
prices and agricultural labour force productivity11 are critical for
people’s welfare and long term economic growth and structural
change. Value added in the agricultural sector divided by size of
the agricultural labour force should then be an appropriate measure
of agricultural productivity. Difﬁculties in choice of price measures
to account for changing prices across different agricultural commod-
ities can be addressed by measuring value added in terms of cereal
equivalents, by dividing value added by the price of cereals. This
sidesteps the pricing problem (provided that equivalent measures
are used for current prices of cereals and in value added measures)
and simultaneously recognises the fundamental importance of sta-
ple food prices relative to all economies, rich and poor, as well as
to poor people.
We propose, therefore, as a core indicator of agricultural devel-
opment and its wider contribution to the economies of which it is a
part, an indicator we term the Cereal Equivalent Productivity of
Agricultural Labour (or CEPAL) where
CEPAL ¼ Agriculture Value Added
Agricultural Workers  Cereal Prices
Operationalisation of this indicator requires deﬁnition and
sourcing of each of the variables. This is not, in principle, a difﬁ-
culty for ‘Agriculture Value Added’ or for ‘Agricultural Workers’,
for which data are routinely available at country level in the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011).12 There
are more difﬁculties with cereal prices. Questions arise about the rel-
ative desirability and availability of international prices and of
domestic prices, about the weighting of different cereals in aggregate
prices, and for some countries about the inclusion of non-cereal sta-
ples. An argument can be made for using international prices if these
differ from domestic prices as a result of government interventions,
as under these circumstances international prices may be a better
measure of true efﬁciency prices. However this will not be the case
if prices differ as a result of natural barriers to trade. In either case
weighting of different cereals’ prices should take account of their rel-
ative importance in local consumption, and ideally one would move
from prices of staples to prices per kcal from all staples, including
root crops, weighted by their caloriﬁc share in food consumption.11 It should be noted here that productivity per hour worked is not critical for the
processes of structural change and development discussed earlier: it is the average
productivity per agricultural worker that is critical, whether fully or partially
employed, or indeed unemployed. Increases in productivity per hour worked are not
beneﬁcial if they are achieved with rising unemployment levels for agricultural
workers displaced, for example, by large scale mechanisation.
12 The WDI provides ‘Agriculture Value Added’ and ‘Agricultural Value Added per
Worker at constant 2000 US$’, from which Agricultural Workers can be calculated.
FAOSTAT also provides data on ‘Total economically active population in Agriculture’.
The two sources have very similar data, though the WDI data appears to have fewer
inconsistencies. Data quality is an issue, which we discuss later.There are, however, practical difﬁculties in obtaining data on local
prices and consumption shares. FAOSTAT has domestic producer
prices from 1991, but data series are not complete and appear to
contain some discrepancies. No readily available and comprehensive
source was identiﬁed with yearly data by country on staple con-
sumption shares (FAOSTAT has information on production shares,
but this will not be appropriate for countries with large grain im-
ports or exports).
To provide some test of the indicator, data series for CEPAL were
constructed ﬁrst using international grain prices from the World
Bank (World Bank, 2012a) and then (for countries but not regions)
using domestic producer prices from FAOSTAT, weighted by pro-
duction shares (FAO, 2011).
Indicators may be presented using absolute estimates (in kg of
cereal equivalent per worker) or indexed, the former allowing
comparison between countries and regions and the latter allowing
analysis of changes in productivity within and across countries and
regions.
Fig. 3 shows estimates of CEPAL by country income group, ﬁrst
with raw values and then indexed. There are striking differences
between raw values of labour productivity between the high in-
come group and other groups (requiring raw data for high income
countries to be scaled separately on the left hand axis in Fig. 3a).
Cereal equivalent labour productivity rises steadily from low to
high income groups, and has generally risen from 1980 to 2010, ex-
cept for low income countries – but the extent of the rise varies be-
tween income groups and falls during periods of high cereal
prices.13 A fall in CEPAL from 2004 in high income countries (also re-
ﬂected in the global CEPAL estimate) may be explained by changes in
agricultural support policies in OECD countries (Poulton, pers.
commun.).
Figs. A1–A3, in Annex A, show estimates of CEPAL and indexed
CEPAL for selected countries in Asia, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin
America, and also compare estimates using international grain
prices with those using weighted domestic producer prices from
FAOSTAT. The data set constructed with domestic prices is less
complete and shows less variability, but otherwise yields broadly
similar patterns as obtained with international prices. CEPAL
therefore appears to be a valid and useful indicator for supporting
national and international target setting and monitoring, although
further work is needed to develop and improve domestic price
data. Standardisation in the deﬁnition of and data collection on
agricultural workers may also need investigation and improve-
ment – agricultural labour productivity may be underestimated
in low income countries, for example, where rural people may be
classiﬁed as agricultural workers but obtain substantial propor-
tions of their incomes from non-farm activities (Haggblade et al.,
2010; Reardon, 1998).
Our earlier consideration of agricultural productivity’s role in
stimulating economic growth and structural change also high-
lighted threats to agricultural labour productivity from environ-
mental constraints or costs in using fossil fuels in agriculture and
from limits to further expansion of agricultural land.14 It is there-
fore also appropriate to develop targets for monitoring land and en-
ergy productivity in agriculture. Similar indicators to CEPAL can be
constructed by replacing agricultural labour by land and fertiliser13 Although grain prices rises lead to a fall in productivity measured by CEPAL (due
to a fall in the relative price of non-cereal agricultural produce), the relationship
between falling grain prices and rising measures of productivity is not linear because
very low grain prices lead to very low value addition in cereal production, and even
losses. Given cereals’ large share of global agricultural production this depresses
agricultural productivity measured by CEPAL. Low prices may also lead to reduction
in production and higher prices in subsequent years as farmers switch out of cereal
production and/or reduce input use in cereal production.
14 The other critical productivity challenge that requires an equivalent indicator is
perhaps water productivity.
Fig. 3. CEPAL (tonnes grain equivalent/worker) by country income group. For (a) OECD high income group is scaled on the left hand axis, other income groups on the right.
Source: calculated using World Bank international grain prices and weights.
Fig. 4. CELY (value added tonnes grain equivalent/ha) and CEPIF (value added tonnes grain equivalent/tonne fertiliser) by country groups. Source: calculated as described in
text using international grain prices. Information on fertiliser use only available from 2002 to 2008.
46 A. Dorward / Food Policy 39 (2013) 40–50use in the CEPAL formula. We therefore deﬁne Cereal Equivalent
Land Yield (CELY) as
CELY ¼ Agriculture Value Added
Agricultural Land  Cereal Prices
and Cereal Equivalent Productivity of Inorganic Fertiliser (CEPIF)15
as15 No direct measure of energy or fossil fuel use in agriculture is available. However
manufacture of inorganic nitrogenous fertiliser is a major user of energy so fertiliser
use is proposed as a proxy for energy use, using World Development Indicators data
on inorganic fertiliser use. No estimates of the relative importance of fertilisers in
agricultural energy demands in different regions or economies could be located, but
examination of speciﬁc studies (Cruse et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2006; Pimentel, 2009)
and the dramatic growth in fertiliser use in low and middle income countries suggest
that fertiliser use accounts for a major part of energy and fossil fuel requirements in
low and middle income countries. In high income countries greater use of machinery
means fertiliser use is likely to account for less than half but a substantial proportion
of agriculture’s energy demands. Limiting inorganic fertiliser use can also yield
environmental beneﬁts through reduced nitrate pollution and nitrous oxide emis-
sions, and could slow depletion of limited global stocks of phosphates.CEPIF ¼ Agriculture Value Added
Inorganic fertiliser use  Cereal PricesFig. 4 presents estimates of these two indicators by country in-
come groups. Estimates for selected countries are presented in An-
nex A.
As with CEPALs, cereal equivalent land yield rises steadily in
Fig. 4 from low to high income groups, and has generally risen from
1980 to 2010, except for low income countries, with the extent of
the rise varying between income groups, and with falls during peri-
ods of high cereal prices (in the early and late 90s and in 2008) and
from 2004 in high income countries. A sudden drop in upper mid-
dle income countries’ CELY in 1992 appears to be due to an unex-
plained rise in middle income countries’ cereal areas in 1992.
Values for Cereal Equivalent Land Yield (CELY) are heavily af-
fected by land quality. This is not obvious in the income group
comparisons in Fig. 4a, as there is some averaging of land qualities
across countries. However Fig. A4(a) in Annex A shows marked
CELY differences across countries – as some countries are able to
Fig. 5. Illustrative sustainable agricultural productivity targets.
A. Dorward / Food Policy 39 (2013) 40–50 47apply irrigation to obtain two or three crops per year in much of
their agricultural land, while in others agriculture may be domi-
nated by extensive low quality grazing lands. The value of this indi-
cator in cross country comparisons is therefore limited. However it
has considerable value as an indicator of changes in productivity
over time within countries, and for regions and the world as a
whole.
Figs. 3 and 4 together highlight the challenge facing agriculture
in each country and across the world – how to get high income
countries’ high labour and land productivity (shown by high CEPAL
and CELY values in Figs. 3 and 4a) without high use of fertiliser
which leads to low fertiliser productivity (CEPIF) in Fig. 4b. On
the other hand low income countries are unlikely to achieve high
yields and labour productivity with their low rates of fertiliser
use – with many crops grown without fertiliser at all, and unsus-
tainable soil mining in some areas. Low income countries will
therefore need higher fertiliser use and lower aggregate fertiliser
productivity to raise their yields – though there is scope for
improving productivity of existing fertiliser use. Major challenges
are faced by lower and upper middle income countries as these
countries are responsible for the majority of the world’s fertiliser
use but have low fertiliser productivity. Fig. 5 demonstrates these
challenges, comparing 2008 global and high income (OECD) coun-
tries’ CEPAL, CELY16 and CEPIF with illustrative sustainable targets
for these variables.17 Although the precise targets can be debated,
Fig. 5 illustrates well the challenge facing world agriculture: how
to dramatically raise agricultural labour and land productivity while
reducing external input use – when high external input use has been
a major basis for past increases in labour and land productivity. Most
discussions of the challenges facing world agriculture focus on the
need to maintain yields with lower external input use (that is with
much higher external input productivity) but pay scant speciﬁc
attention to the critical challenge of raising agricultural labour pro-
ductivity (for example Foley et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011; Godfray
et al., 2010b; IAASTD, 2009; Naylor, 2011; Pretty et al., 2011).1816 CELY is measured per 50ha to provide a comparable scale with CEPAL and CEPIF.
17 The setting of such targets is notoriously difﬁcult and contentious, as a result of
both uncertain information (on current performance, future technical possibilities
and costs) and differential costs, beneﬁts and aspirations between countries and
interest groups. As an illustrative starting point we use a CELY target of 200% of the
global 2008 value (Foley et al., 2011). If production were to double with constant
global fertiliser use then this would require a doubling in CEPIF: the 75% reduction in
agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions suggested by Foley et al. (2011) would need
major reductions in emissions from land use change and livestock production in
addition to reduced emissions in fertiliser production and use. The (somewhat
arbitrary) CEPAL target is 50% of the high income (OECD) 2008 CEPAL (10 times the
2008 global value).
18 The only explicit mention in any of these publications of the need for increases in
labour productivity was in Foresight (2011) p156 where it was included in a list of
potential indicators in a ‘food system dashboard’.An indicator of real food prices relative to real incomes
Having considered possible indicators for national and interna-
tional setting and monitoring of agricultural development targets,
we now consider possible indicators for monitoring food prices.
Indicators should comply with the principles for ‘useful’ indicators
set out at the beginning of the previous section (they should be rel-
evant, based on sound theory, intuitively meaningful, consistently
applicable across time and countries, and use (potentially) avail-
able data). In addition they should attempt to address the major
shortcoming of current widespread use of ‘real prices’ relative to
retail or manufacturing price indices: their failure to represent
the ‘income effect’ of high prices on poor consumers.
The core impact of the ‘income effect’ of food price increases is a
reduction in consumers’ incomes available for purchase of non-
food goods and services. This is particularly serious for poor people
given the limited opportunities they have to substitute cheaper for
more expensive foods (since they are already buying cheaper
foods) and the large share of their income and expenditure that
are typically taken by food expenditures. We therefore propose
an indicator, the Food Expenditure Ratio (or FER), which is deﬁned
as the expenditure required to meet essential caloriﬁc require-
ments divided by resources available for non-staple food after
expenditure on essential caloriﬁc requirements or
FER ¼ Essential calorific expenditure
Total per capita expenditure Essential calorific expenditure
The FER varies with per capita expenditures, minimum caloriﬁc
requirements, and calorie prices. We propose that the FER is de-
ﬁned for speciﬁc expenditure fractiles in a population, with, for
example, FERD1 for mean expenditure of the ﬁrst (lowest) expen-
diture decile in a population and FERQ3 for mean expenditure of
the middle quintile in a population (which may approximate the
median expenditure of the population). Information on mean in-
comes and expenditure by decile and quintile is increasingly avail-
able at country level from LSMS and other surveys, and has been
compiled by WIDER (2008) and Solt (2012). To provide a test and
proof of concept, estimates of FERD1 and FERQ3 were developed
for selected countries and selected regions of the world by ﬁrst
obtaining rough estimates of the proportion of total expenditure
by the lowest decile and the mid-quintile (as detailed in Annex
B). These allowed estimation of the mean per capita expenditure
in each of the two fractiles as a percentage of total household
expenditure, which when multiplied by household ﬁnal consump-
tion expenditure in current US$ and divided by population (from
World Bank (2011), codes NE.CON.PRVT.CD and SP.POP.TOTL)
provided an estimate of mean per capita expenditure in each
fractile. Essential caloriﬁc requirements were speciﬁed as
1800 kcal per person per day (in line with FAO standards), and
expenditure on grain required to obtain this estimated using a
standard 3500 kcal/kg grain (Shapouri et al., 2009), and interna-
tional grain prices (in current US$) estimated with prices and grain
index weights taken from World Bank (2012a).
Fig. 6 shows estimated FERD1 and FERQ3 for major regions of
the world from 1990, while Annex C shows estimated FERD1 and
FERQ3 for selected countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa.
In broad terms, the patterns in the ﬁgures suggest that the indi-
cator represents well the different impacts of food price increases
on different households. In all ﬁgures, for example, the FERD1 val-
ues are substantially higher than FERQ3 values and more sensitive
to food price shocks (as in the mid 1990s and 2007/8). However
these differences are less marked in more wealthy economies
and in those that have become more wealthy over time, but they
remain marked in Africa. This is consistent ﬁrst with the lack of in-
come and agricultural growth in Africa in the 90s (coupled with
Fig. 6. Food expenditure ratios (FERs) for Decile 1 and Quintile 3 by regions. Source: see text.
19 Discussion will also be framed by fundamental questions regarding the purpose
of a post-2015 agreement in a very different global context from the one that framed
the MDGs (Melamed, 2012a).
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America (Dikhanov, 2005) and with Headey’s observations and
argument that the food crisis impacts have been substantially
mitigated by economic growth in India and China. A strength of
the FER indicator is the way that it takes into account the extent
and distribution of economic growth within economies.
There are, however, some apparent anomalies, such as the very
high values for the East Asia Paciﬁc region before 1993. There are
substantially more anomalies for FER estimates prior to 1990 and
in estimates for some countries (for example Madagascar, Zambia
and Cameroon had to be dropped from Annex C). There may be a
number of explanations for the more extreme values:
 The cost of meeting caloriﬁc requirements is calculated using
international grain prices. However there is substantial varia-
tion in the extent to which international prices are transmitted
to domestic markets, and governments may take speciﬁc mea-
sures to reduce this to protect domestic consumers when inter-
national prices are high.
 Weights accorded to different grains are determined by relative
international production and consumption patterns, but these
will vary for speciﬁc countries.
 In poor agrarian economies with signiﬁcant numbers of poor
food deﬁcit producers, a substantial proportion of their caloriﬁc
requirements may not be purchased, reducing their vulnerabil-
ity to price increase (although capital constraints and hungry
periods may mean that price increases nevertheless affect them
very badly).
 When faced with serious price increases poor people do switch
from more diverse diets and reduce their intake particularly of
more nutritious food. They also borrow, draw down on savings
and sell assets to maintain essential food intake, as well as
reduce their non-food expenditures.
 The estimate used of ﬁrst decile share of consumption in sub
Saharan Africa may well be too low (see Annex B). Raising the
income share lowers the graphed FERD1 for sub Saharan Africa
across all years, but does not change Africa’s pattern of greater
variability and less general improvement over time.
The principal ways in which the calculations and estimates pre-
sented here could be improved would be with:
 use of domestic rather than international prices;
 use of country speciﬁc weights across different grains (and sta-
ple roots and tubers); improved estimates of decile and quintile incomes within and
across countries;
 allowance for consumption of some livestock products as
‘essential’ in less poor countries and among less poor consum-
ers in low income economies.
However, as Fig. 6 shows in comparison with Fig. 1, the rela-
tively rough and ready trial estimation presented here captures a
number of important features about real food prices measured in
terms of opportunity cost of non-food expenditures allowing for
income effects, particularly for the poor (Dorward, 2012). It also al-
lows for global regional and country analysis concerned about food
insecurity, poverty reduction and economic development and of-
fers substantial advantages over current calculations of ‘real prices’
deﬂated by price indices.
Post 2015 international indicators and goals
The two previous sections of this paper have proposed and
tested four measures of agricultural productivity and of food
prices, measures developed to address current gaps and failures
in commonly used measures. We now brieﬂy discuss these mea-
sures in the context of growing interest in what should follow
the MDGs after they expire in 2015.
Debate on successors to the MDGs has followed two main
strands: assuming that some international global agreement is
needed on global challenges, ﬁrst what process should lead to
the establishment of goals, and second what challenges should
be addressed (what goals, targets and indicators should be estab-
lished). The two strands are connected, in that the process should
determine what challenges are focussed on, but they can and
should also be pursued independently – all stakeholders, in
whatever process of goal, target and indicator establishment
should beneﬁt from informed analysis and discussion of these
issues.19
The four measures proposed in this paper speciﬁcally address
calls for a post 2015 international agreement to include explicit
attention to the problems of agriculture, the environment, sus-
tainability, growth and food security; to integration and holism
across and within sectors; to aggregate and disaggregated targets
A. Dorward / Food Policy 39 (2013) 40–50 49and indicators that promote accountability; and to changes
needed as regards production and consumption within high as
well as middle and low income economies (for example BOND,
2011; Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP), 2011; Mela-
med, 2012a,b; Waage et al., 2010). In this CEPAL’s integration with
CELY and CEPIF provides holistic attention to the environment,
sustainability and growth in high as well as low and middle in-
come countries (as in Fig. 5). The FERD1 is concerned with the ef-
fects of food price changes on equity and food security. All the
measures have been examined at both global, regional or income
group and national scales of aggregation and disaggregation. Fur-
thermore, they comply with principles for ‘useful’ indicators set
out earlier. There is, however, need for substantial improvement
in the coverage and reliability of some national and international
statistics and statistical systems – for example there are widely
recognised difﬁculties with international statistics on agricultural
production and areas (for example Headey, 2011), with gaps in
coverage of income and expenditure surveys and domestic price
information and, as noted earlier, in standard deﬁnitions of vari-
ables such as ‘agricultural employment’. Assimilation of these
indicators into post 2015 goals and targets could therefore not
only utilise existing data on these issues, but also stimulate
improvements in information on them in the future (an important
side beneﬁt of the MDGs was improved information on some top-
ics Waage et al., 2010).Conclusions
This paper has examined the roles of falling food prices relative
to wages in wider economic growth and development. These roles
have a long history in in the development economics literature, but
their consideration seems to have been surprisingly absent from
recent debates about the impacts of high food prices on develop-
ment (impacts which had commonly been seen as beneﬁcial,
through their role in stimulating research investment).
The need for low food prices to stimulate wider economic
growth highlights the importance of raising the productivity of
agricultural labour in the economy, particularly in smallholder
agriculture with its critical but temporary and challenging poten-
tial for broad based growth. However the need for increases in
agricultural labour productivity has also been widely overlooked
in recent policy, and there are considerable challenges in raising
agricultural labour productivity. These arise not only in the need
for governments and the global community to recognise the public
good characteristics of agricultural labour productivity and invest
in agriculture despite (indeed to encourage) low prices: environ-
mental challenges require a simultaneous fall in fossil fuel and
material inputs which have historically been a major contributor
to rising land and labour productivity. Related to this is a need
for indicators that provide better measures of different types of
agricultural productivity and of food price impacts on particularly
poorer people.
Two sets of indicators proposed in the ﬁnal sections of the paper
go some way to meeting this need. These could be widely imple-
mented, for example supporting new international development
goals when the current Millennium Development Goals expire in
2015. They would require limited further development and cost,
since many of their basic elements are already found within na-
tional and international data systems, but they could support
important improvements in these systems. Further challenges in
agricultural policy, and in the development of related indicators,
need to be addressed in, for example, links between agriculture
and food systems on the one hand with energy, water use, climate
change, land institutions and access, and micro-nutrient deﬁcien-
cies and diet related non-communicable diseases.Acknowledgements
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers, Peter Hazell, Derek
Headey and my colleagues in the Centre for Development, Environ-
ment and Policy for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this pa-
per. The views and any errors or omissions in the paper are, of
course, my responsibility.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.
2012.12.003.References
Binswanger-Mkhize, H.P., Morris, M., 2009. Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant:
Prospects for Commercial Agriculture in the Guinea Savannah Zone and Beyond.
World Bank, Washington, DC.
BOND, 2011. Beyond 2015: Essential Must-haves for a Global Development
Framework.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012. Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers. In: US
Department of Labor (Ed.), Washington, DC.
Chapoto, A., Haggblade, S., Hichaambwa, M., Kabwe, S., Longabaugh, S., Sitko, N.,
Tschirley, D., 2012. Agricultural Transformation in Zambia: Alternative
Institutional Models for Accelerating Agricultural Productivity Growth and
Commercialization, Working Paper 64. Indaba Agricultural Policy Research
Institute (IAPRI), Lusaka.
Christiaensen, L., Demery, L., Kuhl, J., 2011. The (evolving) role of agriculture in
poverty reduction—an empirical perspective. Journal of Development
Economics 96, 239–254.
Collier, P., Dercon, S., 2009. African agriculture in 50 years: smallholders in a rapidly
changing world? Expert Meeting on How to Feed the World in 2050. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Economic and Social
Development Department.
Conforti, P., 2011. Looking ahead in world food and agriculture: perspectives to
2050. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN, Agricultural Development
Economics Division, Economic and Social Development Department, Rome.
Cruse, M.J., Liebman, M., Raman, D.R., Wiedenhoeft, M.H., 2010. Fossil energy use in
conventional and low-external-input cropping systems. Agronomy Journal 102,
934–941.
de Schutter, O., 2011. Agroecology and the Right to Food, Annual Report, Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food. Human Rights Council, United Nations General
Assembly, New York.
Dikhanov, Y., 2005. Trends in Global Income Distribution, 1970–2000, and Scenarios
for 2015, Human Development Report Ofﬁce, Occasional Paper.
Dorward, A.R., 2011. Getting real about food prices. Development Policy Review 29,
647–664.
Dorward, A.R., 2012. The short and medium term impacts of rises in staple food
prices. Food Security 4, 633–645.
Dorward, A.R., Kydd, J.G., Morrison, J.A., Urey, I., 2004. A policy agenda for pro-poor
agricultural growth. World Development 32, 73–89.
FAO, 2011. FAOSTAT (producer prices, production). In: Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (Ed.), Rome.
Foley, J.A., Ramankutty, N., Brauman, K.A., Cassidy, E.S., Gerber, J.S., Johnston, M.,
Mueller, N.D., O’Connell, C., Ray, D.K., West, P.C., Balzer, C., Bennett, E.M.,
Carpenter, S.R., Hill, J., Monfreda, C., Polasky, S., Rockstrom, J., Sheehan, J.,
Siebert, S., Tilman, D., Zaks, D.P.M., 2011. Solutions for a cultivated planet.
Nature 478, 337–342.
Foresight, 2011. The future of food and farming. In: Final Project Report (Ed.), The
Government Ofﬁce for Science, London.
Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP), Beyond 2015, UN Millennium
Campaign, 2011. ‘The World We Want – Beyond 2015’: A Toolkit for National
Deliberations. The Global Call To Action Against Poverty; Beyond 2015; The UN
Millennium Campaign.
Godfray, H.C.J., Beddington, J.R., Crute, I.R., Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J.F.,
Pretty, J., Robinson, S., Thomas, S.M., Toulmin, C., 2010a. Food security: the
challenge of feeding 9 billion people. Science 327, 812–818.
Godfray, H.C.J., Crute, I.R., Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J.F., Nisbet, N., Pretty, J.,
Robinson, S., Toulmin, C., Whiteley, R., 2010b. The future of the global food
system. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 365, 2769–2777.
Haggblade, S., Hazell, P., Reardon, T., 2010. The rural non-farm economy: prospects
for growth and poverty reduction. World Development 38, 1429–1441.
Hazell, P., Poulton, C., Wiggins, S., Dorward, A.R., 2010. The future of small farms:
trajectories and policy priorities. World Development 38, 1349–1361.
Hazell, P.B.R., Wood, S., 2008. Drivers of change in global agriculture. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363, 495–515.
Headey, D., 2011. Was the Global Food Crisis Really a Crisis? Simulations versus
Self-Reporting, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01087. International Food Policy
Research Institute, Washington DC.
50 A. Dorward / Food Policy 39 (2013) 40–50Headey, D., Fan, S., 2010. Reﬂections on the Global Food Crisis: How Did It Happen?
How Has It Hurt? And How Can We Prevent the Next One? Research
Monograph 165. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Hill, J., Nelson, E., Tilman, D., Polasky, S., Tiffany, D., 2006. Environmental, economic,
and energetic costs and beneﬁts of biodiesel and ethanol biofuels. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 103, 11206–11210.
IAASTD, 2009. Synthesis report: a synthesis of the global and sub-global IAASTD
reports. In: Beverly, D., McIntyre Hans, R., Herren Judi Wakhungu Robert, T.,
Watson (Eds.), International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge Science and
Technology for Development. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Jackson, T., 2009. Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet.
Earthscan, London.
Johnston, B.F., Mellor, J.W., 1961. The role of agriculture in economic development.
The American Economic Review 51, 566–593.
Lang, T.I.M., 2010. Crisis? What crisis? The normality of the current food crisis.
Journal of Agrarian Change 10, 87–97.
Lipton, M., 2003. Impact of agricultural research on poverty reduction: messages
from the San Jose workshop. In: Mathur, S., Pachico, D. (Eds.), Agricultural
Research and Poverty Reduction: Some Issues and Evidence. International
Centre for Tropical Agriculture, Cali, Colombia, pp. 7–21.
Lipton, M., Longhurst, R., 1989. New Seeds and Poor People. Routledge, London.
McLellan, F., 2002. Obesity rising to alarming levels around the world. The Lancet
359, 1412.
Melamed, C., 2012a. After 2015: Contexts, Politics and Processes for a post-2015
Global Agreement on Development. Overseas Development Institute, London.
Melamed, C., 2012b. Putting Inequality in the Post-2015 Picture. Overseas
Development Institute, London.
Mellor, J.W. (Ed.), 1995. Agriculture on the Road to Industrialisation. IFPRI/John
Hopkins Press.
Naylor, R., 2011. Expanding the boundaries of agricultural development. Food
Security 3, 233–251.
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Piesse, J., Thirtle, C., 2009. Three bubbles and a panic: an explanatory review of
recent food commodity price events. Food Policy 34, 119–129.
Pimentel, D., 2009. Energy inputs in food crop production in developing and
developed nations. Energies 2, 1–24.
Prentice, A.M., 2006. The emerging epidemic of obesity in developing countries.
International Journal of Epidemiology 35, 93–99.
Pretty, J., Toulmin, C., Williams, S., 2011. Sustainable intensiﬁcation in African
agriculture. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 9, 5–24.
Reardon, T., 1998. Rural non-farm income in developing countries. In: FAO (Ed.),
The State of Food and Agriculture 1998. Food and Agriculture Organisation,
Rome.Ruttan, V.W., Hayami, Y., 1984. Toward a theory of induced institutional innovation.
Journal of Development Studies 20, 203–223.
Schelling, T.C., 1995. What do economists know? American Economist 39, 20–22.
Schmidhuber, J., Bruinsma, J., Boedeker, G., 2011. Capital requirements for
agriculture in developing countries to 2050. In: Conforti, P. (Ed.), Looking
Ahead in World Food and Agriculture: Perspectives to 2050. Food and
Agricultural Organisation of the UN, Agricultural Development Economics
Division, Economic and Social Development Department, Rome, pp. 317–345.
Shapouri, S., Rosen, S., Meade, B., Gale, F., 2009. Food security assessment 2008-9,
GFA-16, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture.
Solt, F., 2012. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database version 3.1.
Timmer, C.P., 1988. The agricultural transformation. In: Chenery, H., Srinivasan, T.N.
(Eds.), The Handbook of Development Economics, vol. I. North Holland,
Amsterdam, pp. 275–331.
Timmer, C.P., 2010. Reﬂections on food crises past. Food Policy 35, 1–11.
Van Der Ploeg, J.D., 2010. The Food Crisis, Industrialized Farming and the Imperial
Regime. Journal of Agrarian Change 10, 98–106.
von Cramon-Taubadel, S., Anriquez, G., de Haen, H., Nivyevskyi, O., 2011.
Investment in developing countries’ food and agriculture: assessing
agricultural capital stocks and their impact on productivity. In: Conforti, P.
(Ed.), Looking Ahead in World Food and Agriculture: Perspectives to 2050. Food
and Agricultural Organisation of the UN, Agricultural Development Economics
Division, Economic and Social Development Department, Rome, pp. 279–316.
Waage, J., Banerji, R., Campbell, O., Chirwa, E., Collender, G., Dieltiens, V., Dorward,
A., Godfrey-Faussett, P., Hanvoravongchai, P., Kingdon, G., Little, A., Mills, A.,
Mulholland, K., Mwinga, A., North, A., Patcharanarumol, W., Poulton, C.,
Tangcharoensathien, V., Unterhalter, E., 2010. The millennium development
goals: a cross-sectoral analysis and principles for goal setting after 2015. The
Lancet 376, 991–1023.
Weis, T., 2010. The accelerating biophysical contradictions of industrial capitalist
agriculture. Journal of Agrarian Change 10, 315–341.
WIDER, U., 2008. UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c,
May 2008.
World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development.
World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank, 2009. Implementing Agriculture for Development: World Bank Group
Agriculture Action Plan FY2010-2012. World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank, 2011. World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2011). University
of Manchester, ESDS International.
World Bank, 2012a. Monthly World Prices of Commodities and Indices (pink
sheets).
World Bank, 2012b. Responding to higher and more volatile world prices, Report
Number 68420-GLB. Agricultural and Rural Development Department, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
